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JEANNE MARECEK
MARY CRAWFORD
DANIELLE POPP
“Sexy Babes! Live 1-on-1!” Perhaps you’ve seen the ads in newspapers
and magazines, with their promise of “Hot Live Talk!” followed by a
toll phone 900-number, “$2.99 per minute,” and easily dismissed re-
strictions, such as “18+” or “Adults Only.” What ideas do these ads
bring forward about sex, gender, and sexualities? One way to account
for phone sex services is that they exist because men have powerful sex
drives that must be satisfied even when a partner is not readily available.
The 900-numbers provide an outlet for men’s innate needs. Another ex-
planation might center on the idea that there are two kinds of women:
good women who would never dream of earning money from “hot talk”
with strangers, and bad women—sluts or whores—who do. Still another
explanation might emphasize that sexual services for hire constitute ex-
ploitation of women. Perhaps the women who deliver such services are
mentally disturbed, destitute, or drug abusers, and they take these de-
grading jobs out of desperation. Yet another account is that sex work is
a job like any other job, and what people choose to do sexually is no
one’s business but their own so long as no one is harmed. Women are
free agents, and those who do phone sex must like it or they would not
do it. Perhaps readers can think of still other ways of understanding why
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some men pay for “hot talk” with “sexy babes,” and why some women
provide this service.
Phone sex is only one of innumerable social phenomena that involve
sex, gender, and sexuality. Phone sex raises many questions about gender
and sexuality, and there are many ways a psychologist might study phone
sex. Here, we use phone sex as a ready example to begin describing how
social constructionists approach an object of study. Social constructionists
would not seek the correct interpretation of phone sex, or the true motives
of the male callers and the “sexy babes” who answer the phones. Nor
would they hope to discover what men really get from a phone encounter.
They might instead examine the range of interpretations of phone sex that
have credence in the culture. Which representations of phone sex workers
(e.g., “deluded victims” or “nymphomaniacs”) make sense to a commu-
nity of listeners, and which (e.g., “wanton sinners”) do not? Social con-
structionists might also observe the social processes by which different ex-
planations are put forward and warranted. How does it come about that
certain accounts of phone sex come to be regarded as obvious or common
sense? Social constructionists might also seek to understand how partici-
pating in phone sex (as a caller, as a “sexy babe,” or perhaps only as a
reader of ads) shapes one’s ideas about sexual desire, male–female
relations, and masculinity and femininity.
Social constructionism raises novel and intriguing questions about
social phenomena related to sex, gender, and sexualities. The family of
ideas and research tools associated with social constructionism provides
a robust approach to understanding the social world and processes by
which meanings are devised, validated, and contested. We begin with an
overview of some important themes of social constructionism, then de-
scribe social constructionists’ work on gender, sex, and sexualities.
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM: AN OVERVIEW
Social Constructionism Is a Theory of Knowledge
Social constructionists hold that what we take to be knowledge is an
account of reality produced collaboratively by a community of
knowers. Such accounts of reality arise through a process of social in-
terchange and negotiation. Social constructionists are interested in the
terms and forms in use among the members of a social group. How do
people make use of those terms and forms to compose accounts that
make sense to others in their social group? When, as social construc-
tionists, we say that gender or sexuality is “socially constructed,” we
do not mean that it is social rather than biological, learned rather than
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innate, or the result of environment rather than heredity. Rather, we
mean that the assumptions and linguistic constructs that enable people
to talk and think about the phenomena are products of social negotia-
tion and are therefore not universal or fixed. Thus, for example, in
some social groups, it is common sense that people are straight, gay,
or bisexual. However, this particular way of accounting for sexual
practices—which entails a large set of implicit propositions about sex-
uality and identity—is only one of many possible accounts. It
contrasts, for example, with accounts offered by queer and
transgender activists (Parlee, 1998).
For social constructionists, concepts and categories are not direct,
unequivocal, and unproblematic reflections of reality. Rather, what peo-
ple consider to be reality takes its form and meaning from the concepts
and categories available to them. Whether we construe the sale of phone
sex as a necessary outlet for men, a job like any other, or a degrading
and immoral practice, we draw on an array of constructs that precedes
and shapes the story we tell: “male sex drive,” “slut,” “free choice,”
“women as victims,” “false consciousness,” and perhaps even “decline
of civilization.”
Knowledge Is a Social Product
For social constructionists, who emphasize the collective character
of knowledge, knowledge is not the product of individual mental pro-
cesses. Accounts of reality, as well as the concepts and categories that or-
ganize them, are specific to a particular time and place. Some researchers
study the social and cultural codes that frame such accounts of reality.
For example, double standards for the sexual behavior of women and
men may be expressed in religious teachings, moral discourses, and me-
dia representations. They are also brought forward in everyday lan-
guage, such as slang (“studs” vs. “sluts”) and proverbs (Crawford &
Popp, 2003). In the recent past, teenage boys were encouraged to “sow
their wild oats,” whereas girls were warned that a prospective husband
“won’t buy the cow if he can get the milk for free.” Other researchers
study the ways that conversation partners jointly construct an account
of specific events. For example, Orenstein’s (1994) study of middle
school students provided an anecdote in which male students construct
and communicate sexual double standards under the eyes of a teacher in
a sex education class. The teacher, Ms. Webster, was trying to illustrate
the risk of sexually transmitted diseases:
“We’ll use a woman,” she says, drawing the Greek symbol for woman on
the blackboard. “Let’s say she is infected, but she hasn’t really noticed yet,
so she has sex with three men.”
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As she draws symbols for men on the board, a heavyset boy in a Chi-
cago Bulls cap stage whispers, “What a slut,” and the class titters.
“Okay,” says Ms. Webster, who doesn’t hear the comment. “Now the
first guy has three sexual encounters in six months.” She turns to draw
three more women’s signs, her back to the class, and several of the boys
point at themselves proudly, striking exaggerated macho poses.
“The second guy was very active, he had intercourse with five
women.” As she turns to the diagram again, two boys stand and take bows.
During the entire diagramming process, the girls in the class remain si-
lent. (p. 61)
Accounts of reality, as well as concepts and categories, have histo-
ries. They arise in particular times and places, and change as circum-
stances and social realities change. This is true of both scientific and ev-
eryday concepts. Parlee (1994) has traced the struggles among doctors,
social scientists, drug manufacturers, and feminist health activists over
the meanings of the term premenstrual syndrome (PMS). At issue were
its name and, more important, whether it was to be defined as a psychi-
atric condition, a gynecological disorder, or a normal variant of female
functioning. As one might surmise, both money and power were at
stake. Assembling the histories of concepts and constructs—genealogies
of knowledge, as Foucault (1972) called them—is an important part of
social constructionist scholarship. Such scholarship documents the in-
vention of constructs, overt controversy over their meaning, and
slippages and shifts in meaning over time.
Social Constructionists Attend to Power and Hierarchy
For social constructionists, power, along with its associated differences
in status, entitlement, efficacy, and self-respect, is a central dimension of
social life. Viewed from afar, power may appear entrenched. Yet power
is not a fixed and invariant property of individuals; rather, it is a net-
work of noncentralized forces. It is continually produced, contested, re-
sisted, and subverted. By examining social interchanges in close detail,
social constructionists document the micropolitics of subordination,
dominance, and resistance. Furthermore, power is not limited to exter-
nal forces that restrict, prohibit, and constrain people. Modern systems
of power operate by heightening self-surveillance and self-control.
Foucault, who referred to these systems of power as “technologies of the
self,” pointed out how individuals come to take pride and pleasure in the
ways that they exert discipline and restraint over themselves. For exam-
ple, because current North American norms of masculinity prescribe re-
stricted emotionality for men, boys monitor their own and other boys’
emotional displays in order to suppress them. In a study of white, subur-
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ban teenage boys, Oransky and Marecek (2002) noted that the boys val-
ued the ability to distance themselves from negative feelings, to be able
to “take it like a man.” They also valued teasing and bullying, because
such hostile interactions helped them to toughen up, to learn to “suck it
up.”
Social constructionists’ insistence on the social character of knowl-
edge opens the way to consider the politics of knowledge. Some ac-
counts of reality become dominant discourses, assuming the status of
truth or common sense; others remain muted or unavailable. What are
the interactional processes by which some accounts get shunted off to
the side, whereas others prevail? Whose accounts are authorized and
supported? Whose accounts are marginalized and subjugated? By con-
necting the circulation of power in immediate interpersonal encounters
to the larger culture, social constructionists hope to offer an account of
how particular language practices and discourses gain their meaning and
potency.
Language Makes a Difference
To use language is to participate in culture. To speak intelligibly is to
make use of the linguistic genres available within the culture. It is to par-
ticipate in a system that is already constituted (Gergen, 1985). In this
way, language precedes and outlives an individual. The classifications
and categories provided by language establish distinctions that “make a
difference.” Such classifications guide our actions and carry implications
for how we should evaluate and react to individuals or events (Hare-
Mustin & Marecek, 1990). They also, of course, regulate our own ac-
tions. Such classification systems are power-laden in the sense that they
often create hierarchies of value, prestige, morality, and authority (good
vs. evil, beautiful vs. ugly, smart vs. dumb).
Language is a representation of reality, not a direct replica of it.
Concepts and categories embed shared, culture-specific meanings. For
example, categories such as “gay,” “straight,” and “bisexual” embed a
particular account of sexual desire. They are more or less discrete classi-
fications that are relatively enduring. Moreover, they render sexual de-
sire as a key aspect of personal identity. As we discuss, other accounts
bring forward more fluid and expansive forms of desire. Moreover, in
this category system, the sex of one’s partner is the key dimension of de-
sire; other dimensions are rendered unimportant. This category system
helps to establish homosexual and bisexual desire as different and
“other,” thus shoring up the superiority and “normalcy” of
heterosexuality.
Concepts and categories associated with gender, sex, and sexuality
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work to regulate social behavior and identity. The concept of a male sex
drive and its role in construing sexual encounters is one example. The
construct of an implacable male urge for sex figures in accounts used by
some men to pressure women to have sex with them (Hollway, 1989). It
also figures in accounts that some women give to explain why they
agreed to sex they did not want (Gavey, 1992). It has also figured in post
hoc accounts that serve to excuse men and boys who have engaged in
violent or coercive sex.
Social constructionists do not hold a determinist view of language.
As practitioners of language, individuals can shift or undermine its
meanings. For example, speakers may use irony, humor, and other lin-
guistic and paralinguistic devices to subvert the dominant meanings of
language (Crawford, 1995). In recent decades, homosexual activists
have undermined the homophobic epithets “gay” and “queer” by
reappropriating and investing them with positive meaning. Social con-
structionist research on language brings forward the paradox that peo-
ple are enmeshed in a web of linguistic meanings, yet are able to use lan-
guage in ways that resist or undermine established meanings.
In summary, to speak is to take part in culture, but individuals can
put linguistic forms to novel and subversive uses. Moreover, communica-
tions among people not only convey messages but also make claims
about who the speakers are relative to one another, and about the nature
of their relationships. Relations of power are negotiated through the me-
dium of language (Crawford, 1995; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Thus,
language is an activity with practical, material consequences.
Social Constructionism Focuses on Processes
From a social constructionist perspective, meanings are not fixed, but
are instead always emergent in human interactions. (This is what con-
structionists mean when they say that meanings are “co-constructed.”)
Moreover, people do not passively imbibe cultural messages without
awareness, nor do they simply parrot cultural discourses unreflectively.
Social constructionists examine the social activities, language practices,
and other social processes through which people account for themselves
as gendered and sexed actors. They expect that people will not sustain
coherent and unchanging accounts of themselves. Social constructionists
often are specifically interested in how people shift among different ac-
counts as they move through differing situations and relationships. The
ongoing production of meanings is part of the flow of social life. People
produce meanings of gender, sex, and sexualities that are provisional,
contingent, and specific to particular settings. Therefore, social construc-
tionists do not attempt to assert universally applicable or enduring
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claims about gender, sex, or sexual orientation. This sets social construc-
tionist accounts of gender and sexuality apart from those of theoretical
approaches such as evolutionary psychology. Moreover, social construc-
tionists are skeptical of technologies, such as scales or inventories, that
attempt to measure masculinity and femininity as enduring personal
qualities.
Individual and Society Are Indissoluble
The Western philosophical tradition of liberal humanism views the self
as bounded and separate from society (cf. Henriques, 1998). In this
view, social life is the context that surrounds individuals and influences
their thoughts and actions. Social constructionists, in contrast, construe
the individual and society as mutually constitutive. Berger and
Luckmann (1966) express this as a paradoxical trilogy of statements:
Society is a human product.
Society is an objective reality.
Man is a social product. (p. 61)
Social constructionists favor terms such as culture-in-mind or social
mind to describe the indissolubility of psyche and culture. Many prefer
not to use the term self, because it signifies an independent and unitary
entity. Instead, some speak about subjectivity. Others view people as tak-
ing up different subject positions as they move through various settings.
Cole’s (1996) definition of context is akin to the social constructionist
view:
In seeking uses of the term context which avoid the pitfalls of context as
that which surrounds, I have found it useful to return to the Latin root of
the term, contextere, which means “to weave together.” A similar sense is
given in the Oxford English Dictionary, which refers to context as the con-
nected whole that gives coherence to its parts. (p. 135)
Social Constructionists Look at Phone Sex
Let us return to the phenomenon of phone sex to illuminate some of the
ideas introduced in our overview. We draw on the interviews with phone
sex workers conducted by Hall (1995). Interviewees said that they con-
sciously strove to create themselves as the fantasy women their clients
desired by manipulating their language. As sellers of a commodity, the
workers were aware of the kind of women’s language that is marketable
as “sexy talk.” They created sexy talk by using feminine or flowery
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words, inviting comments, and a dynamic intonation pattern (breathy,
excited, varied in pitch, lilting). In North American culture, listeners of-
ten interpret these features of language as submissive or powerless
(Lakoff, 1975). However, the workers on the fantasy lines did not feel
powerless; they generally felt quite superior to their male callers, whom
they characterized as unintelligent and socially inept.
Hall’s study of phone sex illustrates a number of social constructionist
themes. First, meaning is co-constructed through linguistic practice. The
callers and the workers shared particular ideas of what constituted “sexi-
ness.” Workers drew on this shared cultural knowledge to present them-
selves as “sexy babes.” Second, the phone conversations not only repro-
duced gendered power relations but also complicated and resisted such
relations. On the fantasy lines, sex workers made deliberate use of femi-
nine talk. Such talk is usually heard as submissive and powerless, but
phone workers used it as a resource to exert some power. They enticed call-
ers to part with their money. Perhaps they also exercised some control over
callers’ sexual arousal and, in that way, were able to prolong the time spent
on the phone, thus earning more money. Third, the phone sex workers
constructed accounts of social reality that enabled them to feel superior to
their clients and effective in their jobs. They viewed their customers as in-
ept. By their own accounts, phone workers’ jobs had a number of advan-
tages. The workers exercised some creativity as they generated characters
and scripts. They earned a lot of money and had low overhead (e.g., they
did not need expensive clothing, and they could work from home). And
they could play at sex anonymously and at a distance, with no risk of vio-
lence, sexually transmitted diseases, or social sanctions. However, al-
though individual workers gain some power, phone sex does not enhance
the status or power of women collectively.
Hall’s study invites still further constructionist questions. To the
male callers, the fantasy woman constructed entirely through language
was presumably satisfying. Callers paid well for the service, and many
requested the same worker on repeat calls. But what accounts might
callers offer of their own motives and behavior? How do they classify
the women on the other end of the line? Whose accounts of phone sex
and of phone sex workers are more likely to be heard, those of the call-
ers or the workers? Furthermore, phone sex illustrates the construction-
ist contention that gender arrangements and categories are historically
and culturally situated. Phone sex did not exist in the United States until
recently, and it is absent in many other societies. Indeed, even the term
phone sex is a recent coinage, and not every English speaker is privy to
its meaning. Does the visibility of phone sex—even to those who do not
participate in it—shift ideas about and evaluations of sex (perhaps espe-
cially masturbation)? Do phone sex, Internet sex, and other forms of
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anonymous, distanced sexual encounters undermine the link between
emotional intimacy and sexuality (a linkage that, at least in our time and
place, has been especially important to women)?
Finally, the phone sex study challenged several categories and con-
structs often used in producing accounts of sexual relationships. For ex-
ample, one of the most successful phone sex workers was a man who im-
personated a woman. Clearly, this man was adept in performing
linguistic femininity. How can we account for his performance and the
satisfaction he provided to male callers? Is he a stud? Is he a slut? Are the
sexual encounters in which he engages homosexual ones? Heterosexual
ones? Such categories cannot easily stretch to encompass a sexual en-
counter between two men, in which one poses as a woman and the other
falsely believes his partner is a woman.
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM AND THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF GENDER
Feminists adopted the term gender in the late 1970s to distinguish be-
tween biological mechanisms and the social aspects of maleness and
femaleness. Unger, who introduced this formulation to mainstream
psychology in 1979, defined gender as “those characteristics and traits
socio-culturally considered appropriate to males and females,” which
she termed masculinity and femininity (p. 1085). In this formulation,
sex is to gender as nature is to nurture; that is, sex pertains to what is
biological or natural, whereas gender pertains to what is learned or
cultural. The sex–gender dichotomy enabled psychologists to examine
constructs such as sex roles, sex role socialization, and cultural norms
of masculinity and femininity. The dichotomy is now commonplace in
mainstream psychology. Indeed, it has been the basis for much psycho-
logical research intended to determine what is learned and what is in-
herent; what is malleable and what is not. An example is research on
the femininity, masculinity, and sexual orientation of people with vari-
ations in hormonal or chromosomal components of biological sex. It
has also fueled political and moral debates about what is natural and
proper for each sex.
Social constructionists proceed from different formulations of both
sex and gender. They reject the definition of gender as individual-level
characteristics and traits set in place by social imperatives and cultural
conditioning. They also question the idea that sex is the biological bedrock
and gender is a mere cultural overlay. More specifically, social construc-
tionists question the following aspects of the conventional sex–gender
model: (1) the idea of gender as a property of individuals; (2) the idea of
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gender as static and enduring aspects of individuals; (3) the formulation of
sex and gender as a dichotomy; and (4) the claim that biological sex is a
bedrock that stands apart from and untouched by language and culture.
Social constructionists take a dynamic approach to gender. Rather than re-
garding gender as individual personality or trait differences, they construe
gender as a social process—the shared labor through which we are contin-
ually producing one another as male or female people. The phrase “doing
gender” reflects the social constructionist view. As West and Zimmerman
(1987) say,
The “doing” of gender is undertaken by women and men whose compe-
tence as members of society is hostage to its production. Doing gender in-
volves a complex of socially guided perceptual, interactional, and
micropolitical activities that cast particular pursuits as expressions of mas-
culine and feminine “natures.” . . . Rather than as a property of individu-
als, we conceive of gender as an emergent feature of social situations: both
as an outcome of and a rationale for various social arrangements and as a
means of legitimating one of the most fundamental divisions of society. (p.
380)
Social constructionists also have a distinctive conception of biologi-
cal sex. They do not take sex to be the immutable bedrock that precedes
gender and remains after gender is stripped away. They do not regard
sex, biology, and bodies as ahistorical and prediscursive “givens.” What
any cultural group takes to be natural does not reside outside the realm
of interpretation and language. What are taken as biological facts are ac-
tually situated understandings lodged within webs of assumptions that
shift from one cultural setting to another, from one epoch to another,
and from perhaps from one subgroup to another within the same culture
(e.g., Fausto-Sterling, 2000; Laqueur, 1990). Social constructionists set
themselves the task of investigating the cultural meanings of bodies, bio-
logical processes, and embodied practices. In the next section, we show
how a social constructionist approach offers new and generative ways to
think about gender, sex, and sexuality.
THE PRODUCTION OF GENDER IN SOCIAL LIFE
Performing Gender
We begin by focusing on the individual and how he or she might enact gen-
der in accord with the codes of his or her cultural surround. Let us return to
phone sex to consider the gender performances that take place there. The
phone lines are sites where shared ideas about women’s language are
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overtly manipulated. The sex worker never meets the caller and knows
nothing about him, yet she (or he) must convince him that she (or he) is a
“hot babe,” ready and willing to enjoy fantasy sex with him. Because the
telephone as a medium does not allow for visual stimulation, the fantasy
must be created in words alone. To create the illusion, Hall’s (1995) phone
workers drew on the idioms of pornography. Training manuals for the job
told them to create stereotypical characters—bimbo, nymphomaniac, mis-
tress, slave, lesbian, virgin. They were also instructed to be “bubbly, sexy,
interesting, and interested” (pp. 190–191).
Another example of gender enactment comes from an early social
constructionist project that examined how male-to-female transsexual
individuals “pass” as a gender inconsistent with their biological sex.1
Drawing on interviews, Kessler and McKenna (1978) showed the impor-
tance of speech style—vocabulary, intonation, and other pragmatic as-
pects. In addition, transsexual individuals self-consciously mimicked and
practiced feminine modes of walking, standing, sitting, and gesturing.
Cameron (1996) has nicely summarized the constructionist view of
gender as a social performance:
If I talk like a woman this is not just the inevitable outcome of the fact that
I am a woman; it is one way I have of becoming a woman, producing my-
self as one. There is no such thing as “being a woman” outside the various
practices that define womanhood for my culture—practices ranging from
the sort of work I do to my sexual preferences to the clothes I wear to the
way I use language. (p. 46)
Of course, gender performances are not limited to femininity. In-
deed, femaleness and femininity can be enacted only in contrast to male-
ness and masculinity. For gender to remain a social classification system
of some import, there must be people who enact masculinity. In a study
of male U.S. college students’ conversation while watching a televised
basketball game, Cameron (1997) noted that, in addition to sports talk,
the young men talked about daily events—going to classes, shopping for
food—and their sexual exploits with women. (The male student who
collected the data summarized their talk as “wine, women, and sports.”)
Another important topic was gossip about other (despised) men, whom
they called “gay.” Cameron interpreted such gossip as a way for the stu-
dents to display their own heterosexual masculinity. These men distin-
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guished themselves from “unmasculine” men by denigrating those men
as “artsy-fartsy fags” and “homos.” Cameron noted that this kind of
discursive strategy “is not only about masculinity, it is a sustained per-
formance of masculinity” (p. 590).
People have strong investments in particular ways of doing gender
and in accounting for themselves as particular kinds of women or
men. The basketball game viewers, for example, were invested in ac-
counting for themselves not just as men but as heterosexual men. Peo-
ple may hold firm to certain accounts of themselves even when their
behavior offers disconfirming evidence. In such cases, they may fabri-
cate ingenious narratives that reconcile a preferred self-account with
disconfirming behavior. For example, in a study of dating violence in
young heterosexual couples, Parker (2002) found that some young
women were adamant that they would not tolerate being hit by a boy-
friend (“He hits me once and I’m out of there”). They were invested in
constructing themselves as strong, autonomous, feminist women.
When they were hit, they brought forward mitigating narratives that
excused the violent incident as an exception (“He was drunk”; “He
had a rough week”; “His family was giving him a lot of grief”). These
narratives enabled a woman to remain in a relationship with a violent
partner and still retain an image of herself as a strong woman who
would not permit herself to be hit. Social constructionists take special
interest in the discursive processes at hand to resolve such apparent
contradictions. Focusing on these processes may shed light on the
complex relationships among gender norms, gendered identities, and
gender performances.
Cultural Repertoires of Gender
Members of a culture understand themselves and others through shared
repertoires of meaning. Many social constructionists have studied as-
pects of everyday interactions that create and reaffirm gender difference,
separateness, and hierarchy. To observe how gender is produced through
joint social labor in everyday interactions, consider the talk of adoles-
cent girls. Girls do many different things in talk. One of their most im-
portant accomplishments is to create and sustain friendships by sharing
experiences and feelings in supportive ways. Girls also jointly construct
their femininity: They enact what it is to be a girl in their particular com-
munity and culture. Coates (1996) recorded a conversation among four
16-year-old British girls about one girl as she tried on another girl’s
makeup. In complimenting her (“Doesn’t she look really nice?”; “She
does look nice”; “You should wear makeup more often”), they were be-
ing supportive friends. At the same time, however, they were drawing
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on, and jointly reaffirming, a cultural repertoire in which looking good
is very important, and working on one’s appearance is expected and
rewarded.
Another example is girls’ use of the cultural repertoires concerned
with body size and shape. In a study of high school girls in Arizona,
Nichter (2000) examined adolescent girls’ talk about their bodies. Re-
gardless of their weight and body size, the white girls complained regu-
larly about being too fat (“I’m so fat”; “Look at these thighs”; “I look
terrible in this”). Nichter analyzed the social uses of this incessant “fat
talk.” Girls’ complaints about their weight served many social purposes.
For example, “fat talk” called for support and reassurance from friends
(“No, you look great”). It expressed solidarity and rapport with others.
For example, a thin girl might complain about being fat as a means of
establishing her sameness with other girls and showing that she does not
think she is better than they are. A declaration of being fat might also
constitute an apology for indulging in “fattening” food and a means to
ward off others’ condemnation (“I know I shouldn’t be eating this; I’m
so fat”). Yet even as such “fat talk” lubricates the gears of girls’ social
life, the litany of complaints and rebuttals about fat, and the continual
references to fat, reaffirm body size as a key dimension on which women
and girls are judged.
Contemporary repertoires of gender serve both to maintain the
boundaries and distinctions between men and women and to keep
women subordinated to men. They often naturalize or conceal unequal
power relations, injustice, and even violent coercion. For example,
women’s suppression of their own needs and interests to meet those of
their spouses and children may be attributed to maternal instinct, an
ethic of care, female relationality, or a biological predisposition to “tend
and befriend.” Such formulations locate the origins of such behaviors
within the individual, not in the matrix of social relations. Moreover,
they imply that the behaviors are natural (and perhaps inevitable)
expressions of female nature.
Even at the level of grammatical structures, forms of talk may main-
tain gender difference and domination. For example, speakers and writ-
ers across a variety of settings tend to use passive-voice constructions
and euphemisms that excuse or minimize men’s culpability for violence
against women. Rather than saying that a man raped a woman, one
says, “She was raped,” “A rape was committed,” or even more euphe-
mistically, “The incident occurred.” Indeed, one study quoted a physi-
cian’s report that stated, “Patient was hit in the face by a fist” (Phillips
& Henderson, 1999). Such grammatical practices have been noted in
medical and behavioral science writing, newspaper reports, accounts by
convicted rapists, courtroom transcripts, and in the talk of experts on
rape prevention (Crawford, 1995; Lamb, 1991).
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The Production of Sexual Bodies
Social constructionists do not deny that genes, hormones, and brain
physiology may have effects on behavior and morphology. However
their interest lies in the accounts that people give about sexual bodies,
the cultural meanings inscribed on the body, and the social implications
of those meanings. Kessler (1998) studied intersexed children (i.e., chil-
dren born with ambiguous genitalia), pediatricians, and parents. In the
United States, it is standard medical practice to alter surgically an in-
fant’s genitals when they are deemed ambiguous. The procedures are dif-
ficult, painful, sometimes protracted, and may produce infertility or per-
manent loss of the capacity for sexual pleasure. The assignment of an
intersexed infant to the category male or female, and the surgical inter-
ventions that follow, are based primarily on the size of the infant’s phal-
lic structure. The size difference between a medically acceptable penis
and a medically acceptable clitoris is a mere 11 2 centimeters—a differ-
ence that might not even be noticeable to laypeople. The purpose of
“corrective” surgery is to create male and female genitals as unmistak-
ably different structures. Surely, this is a radical example of social con-
struction: The physical body is reconstructed to match what is
considered to be the proper appearance of male or female anatomy.
The episode of the “Hottentot Venus” affords another example of
how bodies are inscribed with social significance. The Hottentot Venus,
a southern African woman given the name Saartjie Baartman, had geni-
tals and buttocks that became the focus of overwhelming interest and
curiosity in late 19th-century Europe. Baartman was described in the sci-
entific literature of the day as having labia that reached her knees and
abnormally large buttocks. European doctors, public health officials,
and anthropologists regarded these physical characteristics as “primi-
tive” and indicative of the uncontrolled sexual appetites of African
women (Gilman, 1985). Baartman was crudely exhibited in the nude at
scientific meetings, then as a public spectacle. She (and black African
women in general) thus served as an example of moral degeneracy, a
model of what a white woman was not and should not be (Hammonds,
1997). Claims about Baartman’s primitive sexuality also bolstered Euro-
peans’ claims of the civilizing influence and moral “upliftment” brought
to Africa by European imperialism. In the United States, claims of black
women’s hypersexuality entered into Reconstruction era debates about
whether blacks in America were entitled to citizenship (Giddings, 1984).
Sex Categories
Thus far, we have reviewed constructionist explorations of the cultural
meanings ascribed to anatomy. Now, we turn to a more fundamental
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cultural construction, the sex categorization system itself. In contempo-
rary Western societies, biological sex and sex category are conflated;
that is, the agreed-upon criterion for classification as a member of one or
the other sex is male or female external genitalia. Moreover, the idea of
two, and only two, sex categories has achieved the status of biological,
psychological, and moral certainty. Nonetheless, genitalia are usually
not available for public inspection. In fact, the demonstrable existence of
one or another kind of genitalia is actually irrelevant to the ascertain-
ment of sex category in everyday life. People rely instead on insignias of
sex (apparel, names, hair length) as proxies for the genitals that cannot
be seen.
Social constructionists have challenged the commonsense idea that
there can be only two sexes, as determined by genital dimorphism. They
have pointed to social settings in which this does not hold. First, there
are individuals who deliberately display a sexual insignia that is discor-
dant with their genitals. These individuals range from some whose dis-
plays are relatively transitory—such as the male phone-sex worker who
convinced callers that they were interacting with a woman—to others
who “pass” for most of their lives. The Internet is a site where some peo-
ple experiment with sex categories. Some chat room denizens manipu-
late sexual insignias (names, biographies, verbal style) to assume a sex-
ual identity other than their off-line one. The motive may be playful
experimentation, encouraged by the anonymity and distance that the
Internet provides (Herrup, 2001). But the deception may also have less
innocent goals. For example, a male psychiatrist posing as a woman
named Joan initiated numerous on-line intimate relationships with
women. His motive was a voyeuristic interest in “lesbian cybersex” (Van
Gelder, 1985).
The conventional Western view that there can be only two sexes is
not universally shared. For example, in India, hijras constitute a third
sex category. It is not genitalia that determine whether one is a hijra.
Some hijras are physical hermaphrodites, others have male genitalia, and
still others were born with male genitalia but elected to undergo castra-
tion. Hijras adopt female names and wear women’s clothing. However,
they do not attempt to pass as women. Their manner of displaying fe-
male insignias—heavy makeup; long, unbound hair; sexualized ges-
tures—sets them apart from women in general and marks them as hijras
(Nanda, 1990).
In Thailand, kathoeys represent a third sex. A kathoey has male
genitalia but dresses in women’s clothing. But a kathoey is not a man
who wishes to be (or become) a woman. Nor do kathoeys believe that
they have “a woman’s mind” trapped inside the “wrong body” (an ac-
count that some American and European transsexuals give of them-
206 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GENDER
C
op
yr
ig
ht
 ©
 2
00
4.
 G
ui
lfo
rd
 P
ub
lic
at
io
ns
. A
ll 
rig
ht
s 
re
se
rv
ed
.
selves). According to Herdt, a kathoey “takes some pride in his male
genitals” (1997, p. 149). Moreover, most kathoeys, like most hijras, do
not wish to pass unobtrusively as women. They behave and dress in dra-
matic, loud, brash ways that violate the norms of femininity in Thai cul-
ture, thus distinguishing them from women. Transgender and transsex-
ual activists in the United States also maintain that it is possible to have
more than two sex categories and that a sex category need not be de-
fined by biological sex. The increasingly visible and vocal “trans” move-
ment has put forward an abundance of sex categories: “FTM [Female-
to-Male], MTF [Male-to-Female], eonist, invert, androgyne, butch,
femme, Nellie, queen, third sex, hermaphrodite, tomboy, sissy, drag
king, female impersonator, she-male, he-she, boy-dyke, girlfag, transsex-
ual, transvestite, transgender, cross-dresser” (Stryker, 1998, p. 148).
“Trans” activism has produced not only a bumper crop of new
gender–sex categories but also competing accounts of what they mean.
The term transsexual once referred to someone in transition from one
sex to the other. However, some who identify as transsexual or
transgendered do not regard themselves as either “in between” one sex
and another or “in transition” from one to another. Rather, they regard
“trans” as another sex category (Bornstein, 1994; Elliot & Roen, 1998).
Like hijras and kathoeys, they do not wish to pass as men or women.
Rather, they wish to make their crossing visible, to pose it as a counter to
the dominant account that there are only two sexes. The alternate desig-
nation, genderqueer, which some prefer, makes this aspect of identity
more salient. As Jeffrey Weeks (1995, p. 104) says, the intent is “to upset
the dominant cultural codes and reveal their irrationality, partiality, and
illegitimacy.” Indeed, the transgender movement can be seen as guerilla
warfare against dominant constructions of sex, gender, and sexuality—
dramatized enactments of social constructionism.
Sex, like gender, draws meaning from shifting cultural understand-
ings and ever-changing social practices. Sex categorization is a matter of
insignias and performances (as in on-line manipulations). These catego-
rizations are culture-bound: Westerners, for example, often do not rec-
ognize hijras when they interact with them; to locals, however, hijras are
unmistakable. In the United States, the rising visibility of trans individu-
als in popular culture, along with an increase in “trans” activism and
political organizations, suggests that our system of sex categorization is
destabilizing, shifting, and expanding.
The Construction of Sexuality
Humans engage in a variety of sexual and erotic practices whose mean-
ings and morality vary across historical era and cultural context
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(D’Emilio & Freedman, 1988). What is erotic and arousing in some cul-
tures may be offensive and repellent in others. Romantic attraction to
members of one’s own sex category has different meanings worldwide.
Sexual activity between people of the same sex (which may or may not
involve romantic attraction or emotional intimacy) also has different
meanings. For example, in many societies, sexual activity between young
unmarried men is considered developmentally normal and appropriate.
In some societies, adult–child sexual stimulation is considered appropri-
ate. For the Sambia of New Guinea, for example, boy-insemination was
a common practice until a few decades ago. Semen transfer from older
male relatives to prepubescent boys was regarded as necessary to bring
boys to mature manhood (Herdt, 1997). Although bodily pleasure may
have been involved, the primary motive was familial obligation on the
part of the adult partner. In summary, the meanings of same-sex activity
and the values attached to it vary widely across cultures.
The meanings and values attached to same-sex activity within Euro-
pean and American societies have also varied widely across time. For ex-
ample, in the 19th century, many women in North America had intense
friendships, in which they spent weeks at each others’ homes, slept in the
same beds, and exchanged passionate and tender letters describing the
joys of perfect love and the agonies of parting. Heterosexual marriage
ended many of these relationships, but others endured over a lifetime. At
the time, no one—including the individuals involved—labeled these
women homosexuals or lesbians (Faderman, 1981; Smith-Rosenberg,
1975). Their relationships clearly involved romance, attachment, and
physical intimacy, though we have no way of knowing how many in-
volved genital contact. Were these women “really” lesbians? From a
constructionist point of view, the answer is emphatically “no.” Imputing
the definitions, meanings, terms, and concerns of our day to the past is
an error.
If our contemporary categories of sexual desire (heterosexual, ho-
mosexual, bisexual) do not carve nature at its joints, then what are their
meanings? Let us look briefly at some recent definitions of the term les-
bian by lesbian women:
. . . a woman who loves women, who chooses women to nurture and sup-
port and to create a living environment in which to work creatively and in-
dependently, whether or not her relations with these women are sexual.
(Cook, quoted in Golden, 1987, p. 20)
. . . a woman who has sexual and erotic–emotional ties primarily with
women or who sees herself as centrally involved with a community of self-
identified lesbians. (Ferguson, quoted in Golden, 1987, p. 21)
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It is not having genital intercourse with a woman that is the criterion. There
are lesbian women who have never had genital or any other form of sexual
contact with a woman, while there are also women who have had sex with
other women but who are not lesbian. (Lorde, quoted in Wekker, 1997, p.
18)
A further example is political lesbians, a term for women who choose to
have relationships with women because heterosexual relationships con-
stitute “sleeping with the enemy” (Kitzinger, 1987).
These varying definitions of the term lesbian have been a matter of
lively dispute. Some lesbians regard political lesbians as inauthentic and
set them apart from “true” lesbians. Others object to characterizations
such as Lorde’s, because they downplay eroticism and sexuality in lesbi-
ans’ lives—in their view, a concession to the “nice girl” standards of tra-
ditional femininity. The category “lesbian” is a contested one, with mul-
tiple meanings related to erotic practices, choice of a sexual partner,
emotional attachments, political commitments, and resistance to male
dominance. Different individuals endorse different meanings, and the
same individual might endorse different meanings at different times.
Researchers and clinicians often rely on the typology of heterosex-
ual, homosexual, and bisexual orientations to categorize and describe
sexualities. But everyday understandings and practices concerned with
sexual identity and sexualities are considerably more variegated, com-
plex, and ambiguous. The term sexual orientation implies a deep-seated
and enduring inclination. This way of accounting for sexuality is not
universal; rather, it is specific to our time and place. The idea that one’s
erotic attractions, sexual activities, or emotional attachments necessarily
confer a social identity is similarly an account limited to particular cul-
tural contexts. (In Sri Lanka, sexual activity between young men is com-
mon and unremarkable, but “homosexuality” is regarded as a vile and
decadent product of the West.) Moreover, even in our own society, there
is reason to question the notion of such enduring “orientations.” Dia-
mond (2000), for example, found that among young women she inter-
viewed, fully 50% of those who described themselves as lesbian or bisex-
ual at the time of the first interview had changed their sexual identity
(i.e., their self-described sexual predisposition) more than once by the
time of a follow-up interview 2 years later. Golden (1987) found that a
substantial portion of the college-age women she interviewed regarded
their choice of sexuality as elective and, thus, open to change. Moreover,
people’s accounts of their sexual identities (e.g., straight, gay, lesbian, bi-
sexual) can be discordant with their sexual practices. For example, Bart
(1993) found that many women who identified themselves as lesbians
continued to do so even when they were involved in a sexual relation-
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ship with a man. Similarly, some men identify themselves as heterosexual
even though they have sex with both men and women. In other words,
in everyday practice, the social category “lesbian” is not the same as
“women who have sex with women,” and the social category “male
homosexual” is not the same as “men who have sex with men.” Self-
categorization (e.g., as straight, gay, lesbian, or bisexual) and selection of
a sexual partner are separable.
In some cultural groups in the United States, members hold alterna-
tive meanings of categories of sexual identity or use different categories
altogether. In some Latino subcultures, the Spanish term equivalent to
homosexual refers only to men who assume the passive, receiver role
(coded as feminine) in sexual relations with men (Almaguer, 1991; Car-
rier, 1976). Also, some people identify themselves as bisexual to an-
nounce that they are attracted to people and not to gender categories.
Others label themselves as ambisexual; they reject the term bisexual as
inherently conservative, because it encodes the idea of two and only two
sexes. Others adopt the term spectrum person to indicate that they see
sexuality on a continuum and refuse to be pigeonholed into any cate-
gory. Still others identify as queer, a term that does not refer to any par-
ticular sexual/erotic practice, but rather signifies a commitment to
“dismantl[ing] the standardizing apparatus that organizes all manner of
sexual practices into ‘facts’ of sexual identity” (Berlant & Freeman,
1993, p. 196).
These on-the-ground accounts of sexual identity and sexual prac-
tice are of great interest to social constructionists. It is in terms of
these accounts that people live their lives, form identities, forge close
relationships, and make judgments about others. Understanding the
narratives of sexual lives and identities that flow from these accounts
is a project with considerable practical import (e.g., for HIV/AIDS pre-
vention programs). It is also a project for which constructionist re-
search tools are ideally suited. Social constructionists are also con-
cerned with the political implications of different typologies and
category systems. For example, some people substitute the term sexual
preference for sexual orientation; others reject that term on the
grounds that it implies that one’s sexuality is chosen, thus supporting
conservatives’ efforts to “reform” gay and lesbian people. Some use
the term affectional preference to indicate that their relationships are
not limited to sexual activity; others reject that term as glossing over
physical desire and sexual acts, thus contributing to the continued
invisibility of sexual diversity.
The proliferation of categories and meanings of sexual identities re-
flects contemporary grassroots resistance to authoritative pronounce-
ments about sexuality. But, as is often the case, such resistance is double-
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edged. On the positive side, it signifies emancipation from received cate-
gories and a refusal to live with stigmatized and pathologized identities.
On the negative side, however, the destabilization of categorization
schemes may inhibit social change. Without a collective identity, a
marginalized group cannot easily mobilize for social change. If sexuality
is socially constructed as unstable, fluctuating, and unmoored from
identity, the movement for equal rights for sexual minorities could lose
its core membership and its political purpose.
THE VALUE OF SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM
We have introduced social constructionism as a theory of knowledge
and have discussed a variety of constructionist inquiries into gender, sex,
and sexuality. We have suggested that it has opened important areas of
investigation. Furthermore, it has served as the epistemological ground-
ing for some new social movements related to sex and gender. We now
consider in general terms the value of social constructionism for advanc-
ing the psychology of gender. We identify four areas of contributions
that social constructionists have made thus far.
Pragmatic Empiricism
Constructionists’ projects are often designed to yield knowledge that is
of immediate practical use. Several projects we have described were born
out of a commitment to social transformation; some incorporated an ac-
tion component. External validity, often a scarce commodity in labora-
tory research, is a forte of constructionist inquiry. By investigating mun-
dane activities and forms of talk in real-life locales, researchers come to
grips with social reality in an intimate and firsthand way. The interven-
tions that flow from these projects may be tailored to the specific situa-
tions and social groups that the researcher has investigated. Moreover,
because researchers draw their constructs and categories directly from
the lexicon of their research participants, their findings are more readily
communicated to the communities from which the participants were
drawn.
Social constructionists do not seek to make generalized claims
about human behavior that transcend a particular time, place, and social
group. Nonetheless, their projects may contribute to general knowledge.
The constructs and themes emerging from a particular investigation may
serve as sensitizing devices for subsequent investigations, action projects,
or therapeutic interventions. More generally, by calling attention to
what is taken for granted, social constructionists can bring into view
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what was heretofore unseen. By “denaturalizing” what might have
seemed natural and inevitable, social constructionists’ knowledge can
make a space for political debate, and perhaps for social and political
change.
Building Bridges to Other Disciplines
and to Global Psychologies
In our view, social constructionism can be a bridge to other disciplines,
psychologies, and intellectual movements. It has aspects in common with
the influential intellectual movements grouped under the rubric
postmodernism; thus, it can link psychology to disciplines such as cul-
tural studies, feminist/gender studies, and critical theory. Social
constructionism is also kin to rich and fruitful sociological and anthro-
pological traditions such as symbolic interactionism, practice theories,
and ethnomethodology (cf. Holstein & Gubrium, 2003). Social con-
struction theory and practice may also serve to connect psychology in
the United States to intellectual developments in the psychologies of the
United Kingdom, Europe, Australia, and New Zealand. Indeed, much of
the research that we have cited was carried out in these countries.
Conceptual Innovation and Critique
Social constructionists study the meanings, category systems, and nar-
rative logic of the conceptual worlds that people inhabit. Understand-
ing these conceptual worlds is crucial to understanding how people ex-
plain themselves and others, and how they justify and interpret various
forms of conduct. In many cases, these everyday construals do not
map closely onto formal scientific categories (e.g., recall the plethora
of emerging categories designating alternative genders and categories
of sexuality).
Social constructionists have also turned attention to the scientific
categories and constructs used by psychologists. They have investi-
gated how cultural ideologies, social forces, and historical events shape
these categories and constructs, as well as the production of knowl-
edge in psychology more generally. They have also examined how psy-
chological knowledge reaffirms certain cultural ideologies and justifies
certain social practices by imbuing them with scientific legitimacy.
Feminist social constructionists have been critical of a variety of con-
structs and categories pertaining to gender and sexuality. For instance,
they have challenged the ontological status of categories such as
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female masochism, male sex drive, PMS, and the human sexual
response cycle.
For social constructionists, knowledge is always situated and par-
tial; inevitably, it reflects the perspectives, position, and investments of
the knower. For this reason, many constructionist researchers make
themselves visible in their research reports by describing who they are
and what political commitments they have. In this way, they engage
readers in an inquiry into how researchers’ subjectivity may have shaped
the research process and its outcomes. Some researchers have experi-
mented with innovative procedures designed to accommodate and make
use of the partial and perspectival nature of knowledge. For example, to
analyze open-ended narratives collected from gay men and lesbians,
Russell (2000) assembled a team of five gay and straight people from di-
verse educational, religious, and socioeconomic backgrounds. The
team’s prolonged discussion of divergent coding schemes was central to
the interpretive work and to Russell’s analytical stance. For a social con-
structionist, a researcher’s standpoint influences not only the interpreta-
tion of the findings but also the choice of research questions, the way the
questions are framed, and preferred methodological strategies for
collecting data.
Critical Reflection on Psychology
Social constructionism invites critical reflection on knowledge-making
practices. Such critical reflection goes beyond an evaluation of method-
ological adequacy to encompass value-based, ethical, and political con-
cerns as well. These reflections start with the recognition that psycholo-
gists, like other members of the culture, cannot divorce themselves from
the cultural surround or from its system of meanings. Categories of psy-
chological knowledge are not a priori givens but are historically specific
acts of meaning. Some investigations have excavated the history of psy-
chological concepts (e.g., intelligence, development, self, and stress).
These investigations also trace the social structures and practices that
such scientific constructs served to justify. Other investigations concern
the historical and sociological processes that have formed the discipline.
For example, Morawski (1988) and others have investigated the rise of
experimentation in North American psychology. Porter (1955) has
probed the historical circumstances that led to the reliance on quantifi-
cation and trust in statistics. Danziger (1977) has examined psychology’s
predilections for naming and measuring the mind. Such critical reflec-
tions can make the generation of knowledge more sophisticated
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conceptually, empirically, and politically, no matter which methods of
inquiry researchers use.
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